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1 Question 1.
1. Let us consider an individual who lives for T periods and whose lifetime utility is given by
U =
T∑
t=1
u(Ct), with u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0. (1)
The individual has initial wealth of A0 and labour incomes of Yt, t = 1, . . . , T . Assuming
r = ρ = 0, we can set up the maximum problem as follows:
max
Ct,λ
L =
T∑
t=1
u(Ct) + λ
(
A0 +
T∑
t=1
Yt −
T∑
t=1
Ct
)
. (2)
FOCs are:
∂L
∂Ct
= u′(Ct) = λ; (3)
∂L
∂λ
= A0 +
T∑
t=1
Yt −
T∑
τ=1
Ct = 0. (4)
Since (3) holds for every t, marginal utility of consumption is constant, and consumption
is also constant, thus C1 = C2 = · · · = CT . Using this in (4) yields
Ct =
1
T
(
A0 +
T∑
τ=1
Yτ
)
∀ t. (5)
Saving is defined as
St = Yt − Ct =
= Yt − 1
T
(
A0 +
T∑
τ=1
Yt
)
. (6)
Hence, a rise (Z) in income at t will raise consumption by Z/T (which tends to zero as
T →∞), and raise savings by 1− Z/T (which tends to one as T →∞).
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2. Within this framework, consumption is equal to permanent income (C = Y P ). Current
income can be decomposed in two components, permanent and transitory income (Y =
Y P+Y T ). Since transitory income represents departures of current income from permanent
income, in most samples it has a mean near zero (E[Y T ] = 0) and is roughly uncorrelated
with permanent income (Cov[Y T , Y P ] = 0). Thus, if we set up a regression like
Ci = α+ βYi + εi, (7)
we can use Friedman’s hypothesis to obtain estimated coefficients:
βˆ =
Cov[Y,C]
V ar[Y ]
=
Cov[Y P + Y T , Y P ]
V ar[Y P + Y T ]
=
V ar[Y P ]
V ar[Y P ] + V ar[Y T ]
; (8)
αˆ = C¯ − βˆY¯
= Y¯ P − βˆ(Y¯ P + Y¯ T )
= (1− βˆ)Y¯ P . (9)
Hence, the permanent-income theory predicts that the key determinant of the slope of an
estimated consumption function, βˆ, is the relative variation in permanent and transitory
income (i.e. an increase in Y is associated with an increase in C only if such an increase
reflects an increase in Y P ). On the other hand, the intercept depends upon Y¯ P .
For a discussion about empirical evidence see the textbook, pp. 368–371.
3. Since E[Y T ] = 0, we can say that E[Y ] = E[Y P ]. Thus we are told that, on average, farm-
ers have lower permanent income than non-farmers do (E[Y PF ] < E[Y
P
NF ]). Furthermore,
V ar[Y TF ] > V ar[Y
T
NF ].
From equation (8), as long as V ar[Y PF ] = V ar[Y
P
NF ], we see that βˆF < βˆNF . This means
that a marginal increase in current income increases farmers’ consumption less than it
increases non-farmers’. Intuitively, this is because the increase for farmers is more likely to
be due to transitory rather than permanent income.
As for equation (9), given the fact that E[Y PF ] < E[Y
P
NF ] (i.e. Y¯
P
F < Y¯
P
NF ), we would
expect α¯F < α¯NF . On the other hand, since βˆF < βˆNF , then α¯F > α¯NF . The overall
effect is hence ambiguous.
We can say, however, that at the average level of permanent income for farmers, the
estimated consumption functions for farmers is expected to lie below that for non-farmers.
If the two estimated functions cross, they do so at a level of income less than Y¯ PF .
Consider a non-farmer for whom Yt = Y¯ PF . Since E[Y
P
F ] < E[Y
P
NF ], non-farmers are likely
to have Y¯ Pt > Y¯ PF , hence Yt = Y¯
P
F + Y
T
NF , with the second term that is negative. This
means that a non-farmer with Yt = Y¯ PF will have Ct > Yt.
Consider now a farmer for whom Yt = Y¯ PF . On average, this means that Yt = Y
P
F = Ct.
Thus, the consumption function for farmers is expected to lie below the one for non-farmers
at Y¯ PF .
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4. (a) We need to find an expression for
Ct+2 + Ct+3
2
− Ct + Ct+1
2
(10)
in terms of Ct and εt. We can write
Ct+1 = Ct + εt+1; (11)
Ct+2 = Ct+1 + εt+2 = Ct + εt+1 + εt+2; (12)
Ct+3 = Ct+2 + εt+3 = Ct + εt+1 + εt+2 + εt+3. (13)
Substituting (11)–(13) into (10) yields
Ct+2 + Ct+3
2
− Ct + Ct+1
2
=
Ct + εt+1 + εt+2 + Ct + εt+1 + εt+2 + εt+3
2
− Ct + Ct + εt+1
2
=
εt+3 + 2εt+2 + εt+1
2
. (14)
(b) Through similar manipulation as in part (a), we get
Ct + Ct+1
2
− Ct−2 + Ct−1
2
=
εt+1 + 2εt + εt−1
2
. (15)
Covariance between successive changes is then:
Cov
[(
εt+3 + 2εt+2 + εt+1
2
)
;
(
εt+1 + 2εt + εt−1
2
)]
=
σ2ε
4
. (16)
Equation (16) uses the fact that ε’s are uncorrelated with each other and that the only
term that appears in both expressions is εt+1. Since covariance is positive, measured
consumption in later intervals will be greater than measured consumption in earlier
intervals. For a process {Xt}t∈N to be a random walk, the following condition must
hold
Cov[Xt;Xt+1] = 0 ∀ t. (17)
Hence, while actual consumption Ct is a random walk, measured consumption is not.
(c) From equation (14), the change in measured consumption from (t, t+1) to (t+2, t+3)
depends upon εt+1, which is known at t + 1. Thus the change in consumption from
one two-period interval to the next is not uncorrelated with everything known as of
the first two-period interval. However, it is uncorrelated with everything known as of
the two-period interval immediately preceding (t− 2, t− 1).
(d) Let us write Ct+3 as a function of Ct+1, ε’s.
Ct+3 = Ct+2 + εt+3 = Ct+1 + εt+2 + εt+3. (18)
The change in measured consumption from one two-period interval to the next is
Ct+3 − Ct+1 = εt+2 + εt+3. (19)
Covariance between successive changes in measured consumption is:
Cov
[
(Ct+3 − Ct+1); (Ct+1 − Ct−1)
]
= Cov
[
(εt+2 + εt+3); (εt + εt+1)
]
= 0. (20)
Thus in this case measured consumption is a random walk.
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2 Question 2.
1. Using an Euler equation approach and supposing that the individual has chosen first-period
consumption optimally given the information available. Consider a reduction in C1 of dC
and an equal increase in consumption at some future date. If the individual is optimising,
then a marginal change of this type does not affect expected utility, hence
u′(C1)dC = E[u′(Ct)|I1]dC ∀ t = 1, . . . , T ;
C1 = E[Ct|I1] ∀ t = 1, . . . , T. (21)
The budget constraint is:
A0 +
T∑
t=1
E[Yt|I1] =
T∑
t=1
E[Ct|I1]. (22)
Substituting (21) into (22) and dividing by T yields
C1 =
1
T
(
A0 +
T∑
t=1
E[Yt|I1]
)
. (23)
Equation (21) implies that (by the law of iterated expectations):
Ct = E[Ct|It−1] + εt
Ct−1 + εt. (24)
Consumption, hence, is a martingale (a random walk if we assume ε’s are i.i.d.), which
means that if a variation in income is predictable, the individual would be better off
redistributing consumption across periods (consumption smoothing). This holds if ε is
exogenous.
2. For a discussion, see the textbook, pp. 375–380. Here we briefly report a scheme for
discussion.
Campbell, Mankiw suppose that a portion λ of consumers spend their current income,
so that variation in consumption is equal to the variation in income for the first group,
and equal to the variation in permanent income for the second.
∆Ct = λ(∆Yt) + (1− λ)εt. (25)
Since ∆Yt and εt are correlated, OLS estimator is biased upward. Hence, they use
the IV approach. Instruments are lagged changes in consumption. Estimates of λ are
between 0.42(0.16) and 0.52(0.13). The null is strongly rejected. (Problems: aggregate
data, small sample, measurement errors, individuals not observed)
Shea obtains a coefficient of 0.89(0.46) for households whose wages are covered by long-
term union contracts (high degree of predictability). Results are tested for the presence
of liquidity constraints (that would imply C = Y < Y P ) but there is no evidence that
this could be the reason for Shea’s results.
3. For a discussion, see the textbook, section 8.6..
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4. (Optional)
(a) The government must choose T1, T2 so that their present value is equal to the present
value of the tax on interest income:
T1 +
T2
1 + r
=
r
1 + r
τ(Y1 − C01 ). (26)
(b) Suppose the new tax satisfies equation (26). This means that where the individual
consumes C01 , he pays the same with the new lump-sum tax as he did with the old tax.
Thus at C01 , the individual has just enough to consume C02 in the second period under
both tax schemes. This means that the new budget line must go through (C01 , C02 )
just as the old one did. Hence this combination is just affordable.
(c) First-period consumption must fall. The old budget line had slope −[1+(1−τ)r]; the
new budget line is steeper, with slope −(1 + r). With savings no longer taxed, giving
up one unit of period-one consumption yields more units of period-two consumption
(C2 = [1 + r]C1).
As discussed in part (b), if the government sets the new lump-sum taxes so that
the present value of government revenue is unchanged, the new budget line must
go through the original consumption bundle. We have seen in this point, though,
that return on saving has increased, hence the old bundle (C01 , C02 ) is sub-optimal.
Intuitively, the government has set the tax rate so that there is no income effect, only
a substitution effect.
3 Question 3.
1. Individuals’ demand for assets determine expected returns. Suppose that individuals are
symmetrical and consider a marginal reduction in Ct. The resulting saving is used to buy
an asset i at price P it , that produces an uncertain stream of payoffs Dit+k, k = 1, . . . . If
the representative individual is optimising, Euler equation must hold:
u′(Ct)P it = Et
[ ∞∑
k=1
1
(1 + ρ)k
u′(Ct+k)Dit+k
]
. (27)
Solving this expression for P it gives
P it = Et
[ ∞∑
k=1
1
(1 + ρ)k
u′(Ct+k)
u′(Ct)
Dit+k
]
, (28)
where the term in brackets that multiplies Dit+k is called the stochastic discount factor and
represents individual’s valuation of future payoffs.
Assuming quadratic utility and that individuals hold the asset for one period only, we
define the return on the asset
rit+1 =
Dit+1
P it−1
. (29)
Using these assumptions, we can solve equation (27) for expected returns.
Et
[
1 + rit+1
]
=
1
Et
[
u′(Ct+1)
][(1 + ρ)u′(Ct) + aCovt(1 + rit+1; Ct+1)]. (30)
5
This means that the higher the covariance of an asset’s payoff with consumption, the higher
its expected return must be.
Let us define the return on a risk-free asset as
Et
[
1 + r¯t+1
]
] =
1
Et
[
u′(Ct+1)
][(1 + ρ)u′(Ct)], (31)
and subtracting (31) to (30) gives the expected return premium that an asset must of-
fer relative to the risk-free rate, that is proportional to the covariance of its return with
consumption:
Et[r
i
t+1]− r¯t+1 =
aCovt(1 + rit+1; Ct+1)
Et
[
u′(Ct+1)
] . (32)
This means that the coefficient from a regression of an asset’s return on consumption
growth (consumption beta) is proportional to the premium.
2. Let us consider the case in which the risky asset is a broad portfolio of stocks and assume
CRRA utility. The Euler equation (27) becomes
1 + ρ = Et
[
(1 + rit+1)
C−θt+1
C−θt
]
. (33)
Let gct+1 denote the growth rate of consumption, and omit the time subscripts. Thus we
have
E[(1 + r)(1 + g)−θ] = a+ ρ. (34)
We take then a second-order Taylor approximation of the left-hand side around r = g = 0
and obtain
E[ri]− E[rj ] = θCov(ri − rj , gc). (35)
For a discussion of the empiric evidence about this equation, see the textbook, pp. 388–389.
3. (a) If the individual is optimising, the utility cost of the reduction in consumption must
be equal to the expected utility benefit:
u′(Ct)dC = Et
[
u′(Ct+1)
(
dC
Pt
Yt+1 +
dC
Pt
Pt+1
)]
, (36)
The right-hand side of the equation represents the expected marginal utility times
the benefits in t + 1, i.e. an increase in consumption due to the additional output
provided by the additional trees, and an increase in consumption due to the sale of
the additional trees at price Pt+1.
Informally cancelling out the dC’s and substituting the derivatives of the (log) utility
gives:
C−1t = Et
[
C−1t+1
1 + ρ
1
Pt
(
Yt+1 + Pt+1
)]
1
Yt
=
1
Pt
Et
[
C−1t+1
1 + ρ
(
Yt+1 + Pt+1
)]
Pt =
Yt
1 + ρ
Et
[
Yt+1 + Pt+1
Ct+1
]
. (37)
6
(b) Given these assumptions, equation (36) can be written as:
Pt =
Yt
1 + ρ
Et
[
1 +
Pt+1
Yt+1
]
=
Yt
1 + ρ
+
Yt
1 + ρ
Et
[
Pt+1
Yt+1
]
. (38)
This holds for all periods, so we can write
Pt+1 =
Yt+1
1 + ρ
+
Yt+1
1 + ρ
Et
[
Pt+2
Yt+2
]
. (39)
Substituting (39) into (38) gives
Pt =
Yt
1 + ρ
+
Yt
1 + ρ
Et
[
1
1 + ρ
+
1
1 + ρ
Et+1
(
Pt+2
Yt+2
)]
. (40)
By the law of iterated projections (i.e. ∀ x, Et[Et+1[xt+2]] = Et[xt+2],
Pt =
Yt
1 + ρ
+
Yt
(1 + ρ)2
+
Yt
(1 + ρ)2
Et
[
Pt+2
Yt+2
]
. (41)
After repeated substitutions we get
Pt =
Yt
1 + ρ
+
Yt
(1 + ρ)2
+ · · ·+ Yt
(1 + ρ)s
+
Yt
(1 + ρ)s
Et
[
Pt+s
Yt+s
]
. (42)
Imposing the no-bubbles condition, the price of a tree in period t can be written as
Pt = Yt
[
1
1 + ρ
+
1
(1 + ρ)2
+ . . .
]
= Yt
[
1/(1 + ρ)
1− [1/(1 + ρ)]
]
=
[
1/(1 + ρ)
ρ/(1 + ρ)
]
=
Yt
ρ
. (43)
(c) There are two effects of an increase in the expected value of dividends at some future
date. The first is the fact that at a given marginal utility of consumption, the higher
expected dividends increase the attractiveness of owning trees. This tend to raise the
current price of a tree. However, since consumption equals dividends, higher expected
dividends in that future period mean higher consumption and thus lower marginal
utility of consumption in that future period. This tends to reduce the attractiveness
of owning trees, lowering the current prices. In the case of logarithmic utility, these
two forces exactly offset each other, leaving the current price of a tree unchanged.
(d) The path of consumption is equivalent to the path of output, then consumption is a
random walk if and only if output is. In this model output is exogenously given (by
the trees), so we cannot determine its properties.
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